Abstract: A study of DG Competition's 1996 'Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases' suggests that it largely failed to induce members of active cartels to self-report. Instead, immunity and fine discounts were predominantly awarded in cases where cartels were failing, or had already failed. A majority of leniency cases followed (or were broadly contemporaneous to) equivalent investigations by the US Department of Justice. All but one EU only leniency case had failed before self-reporting occurred. Moreover, nearly half of leniency cases concerned closely related infringements in the chemicals industry. The majority of these US-EU leniency cases had failed (or were failing) at the time of self-reporting. A preliminary analysis of the revised 2002 notice suggests less reliance on US successes, but still more cartels connected to previous infringements in the chemicals industry. A central challenge is preventing the leniency programme from providing a way for failed cartelists to tame the end game, or to use leniency as a strategic tool in order to put former cartel members (now competitors once more) at a disadvantage. Such cases risk overwhelming DG Competition with leniency applications that do little to enhance deterrence.
Introduction
Cartels are typically aware that their conduct is illegal and will go to great lengths to avoid detection. As the OECD notes, 'the challenge in attacking hard-core cartels is to penetrate their cloak of secrecy'
1 . This defining characteristic makes their detection suggested that an effective leniency programme could dramatically increase the rate at which cartels were detected, escalating the rate of punishment and enhancing deterrence. 7 Encouraged by this purported success of the US leniency programme, the European Commission, D-G Competition adopted the 1996 'Notice on the nonimposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases' 8 (henceforth 'the 1996 leniency notice'). The majority of member states have since adopted leniency programmes on the national level, modelled on the Commission's leniency notice, and now on the European Competition Network's 'Model Leniency Programme'. In the UK, a leniency programme was adopted under the Competition Act 1998. The aim of this paper is to test the purported effectiveness of the European Commission's leniency programme, by determining the extent to which self reporting firms were induced to do so by the incentives created by the European leniency notice itself. If the notice is indeed deterrence enhancing, we would expect leniency applications largely from members of profitable cartels that were active at the time of self-reporting. Instead, this paper finds that the majority of applications involve infringements which were: previously/simultaneously revealed in the US; closely linked to each other in the chemicals industry; and which had largely failed or ceased operating before a leniency application was made. These suggests that firms may be using the leniency notice to deflect or discount their liability once a cartel has failed, seeking to put their former cartel members (now again competitors) at a disadvantage.
The findings of this paper draw from a database compiled by the author of information from every horizontal cartel decision delivered by the European Commission, from the introduction of leniency in 1996 to April 2007.
Section II of this paper identifies that the majority of successes enjoyed under the 1996 leniency notice are likely to have resulted from prior or simultaneous US policy success. Section III outlines how most of the cases revealed under the 1996 notice concerned closely related cartels operating in just the chemicals industry.
Employing information primarily contained in Commission decisions and industry literature, it is shown that by the time these cartels were revealed to the European is still discussed at detail in the Commission's final decision. Finally, the US has a plea-bargaining system 18 whereby firms negotiate the exact level of fines they will face, and company directors agree to go to jail for certain lengths of time without the case ever seeing the inside of a court room (other than to approve the plea-bargain).
Plea-bargaining strengthens the corporate leniency policy by providing a quick and certain way for a firm to settle its public liabilities, rather than waiting in limbo for a number of years, overshadowed by the possibility of having fines imposed of an uncertain magnitude. Other features of the US enforcement regime which make selfreporting more likely include the availability of amnesty plus, and some protection from treble damages for revealing firms.
In relation to the 1996 leniency notice, the DOJ's first mover advantage in If we are to assume that the level of fines imposed in cartel cases reflects the severity of each infringement, then as much as 63 per cent 29 of 1996 leniency notice success in uncovering cartels, may have been on the back of the success of DOJ investigations and of the corporate leniency policy. Only just over a third of EC leniency success was independent of US investigations, which means that only just over a quarter of total prosecutions (in terms of fines imposed) came about as a result of the 1996 leniency notice only.
B. A closer look at EU only leniency success: failed cartels
Under closer scrutiny, there is reason to believe that the eight 'EU only leniency investigations' did not come about primarily due to the existence of the leniency notice, despite the fact that US cartel policy was not relevant to them (as they operated principally within the EU and members of the European Economic Area). 
III. 1996 notice: cartels in the chemicals industry
While firms may have applied for leniency in the EU as a result of investigations in the US, their decision to self-report may also have been a result of the cartels failing due to the conditions of the markets in which they operated, as appears to have been the case in all but one of the EU only leniency cases. This section of the paper reviews cartels uncovered by the 1996 leniency notice which operated in the chemicals industry, looking at reasons why they failed. To understand the importance of the chemicals industry to European cartel enforcement, Approximately half of the cartels revealed through the 1996 leniency notice operated in the chemicals industry. Indeed 51 per cent of leniency success in uncovering cartels, in terms of the subsequent fines imposed, involved this industry.
By April 2007, there had been eleven Article 81 Commission decisions involving horizontal cartels in the chemicals industry, which were revealed to the European Commission by leniency applications through the 1996 notice. All eleven were international cartels involving DOJ equivalent or related investigations.
Significantly, in all eleven cases leniency applications were made in Europe after the cartel ceased to operate. 37 This was due to conditions in the chemicals market and due to the close links between the cartels, in terms of common membership by infringing firms. This suggests that the leniency notice did not disrupt the cartels, but that they had already failed for other reasons. The applications for leniency were a natural consequence of firms once more looking to their own interests, rather than those of the cartel. 36 This includes only completed cases, where the Commission has delivered its decision. 37 In the case of Vitamins, three sub-cartels were still operating but the other six had collapsed. Even before US investigations were opened, many of these cartels were failing for reasons which included: gross overcapacity, new competition from Asia (in particular China), distrust, environmental regulation 38 , arbitrage and the unexpected Asia crisis of the late 1990s. Some of these pressures had existed since the 1970s and resulted in extensive mergers, acquisitions and restructuring 39 which made the industry more concentrated in the late 1980s, with collusion more likely as a resultbut they also posed a problem to the operation of cartels as the identities and capacities of the players were constantly changing. These factors are discussed at detail in part B of this section.
A. Links between the chemicals cartels
It is significant that all eleven cartels could be linked to Vitamins by virtue of the fact that a number of firms in the industry were involved in more than one infringement. The discovery of the Vitamins cartel was preceded by the discovery of that detection was inevitable given that Aventis SA was party to all three cartels. This ultimately resulted in Merck KgaA and Aventis SA approaching the Commission to self-report the infringements. Similarly, the decision to end the Choline Chloride (1994-1998) cartel was strongly influenced by the Vitamins investigations, and in particular by the fact that BASF AG was under investigation for its involvement in the Vitamins cartels and was also party to Choline Chloride. Indeed the overlap between firms and different infringements was such that decisions to cease colluding might have been additionally driven by close relationships to cartels other than Vitamins. As illustrated in Figure 4 , three of the firms involved in the Food Flavouring (1989 Flavouring ( -1998 cartel 43 (involving nucleic acid) were also involved in Amino Acids. Archer Daniels
Midland was involved in Amino Acids (1990 -1995 ), Organic Peroxides (1971 -1999 44 and Sodium Gluconate (1987 Gluconate ( -1995 45 cartels contemporaneously.
As well as close links with the US driven investigations into Amino Acids and
Vitamins, there is also evidence that most of the chemicals cartels largely failed prior to self-reporting in Europe, because of conditions in the chemicals market.
B. The failing chemicals cartels
A close examination of the Commission's decisions and industry literature reveals a number of difficulties which had largely undermined the chemicals cartels prior to self-reporting. These included: new entry from China; arbitrage; decline, overcapacity and rising costs; barriers to entry, substitutability and distrust; the Asia crisis of the late 1990s; and the effect of mergers and acquisitions.
New entry from China
The massive export-driven growth of the Chinese chemicals industry in the 1990s meant that international cartels (including Vitamins) were undermined by Chinese products flooding the market, causing cartels to collapse well before the investigations into the Vitamins cartel were opened.
The Citric Acid (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) The Vitamins cartel (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) actually consisted of nine sub-cartels operating in parallel to each other and involving the same firms. Of these, only three (vitamins A&E, B5 and D3) were operating when the DOJ opened its investigations into the vitamins industry in late 1997. The other six had by this time failed. The main reason for their failure was the emergence of new Chinese producers which, as early as 1992, were preventing the cartels from reaching their target prices -purportedly going as far as to sell at below production cost in order to break the cartels. 51 The Vitamin B1 (1991-1994), B6 (1991-1994), C (1991-1995) and Folic Acid (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) ) cartels all failed because Chinese producers (not party to the cartels) increased their capacity in the early 1990s to levels that the cartels could not absorb. By 1995 all five cartels had collapsed, as firms were forced to stop colluding and reduce prices to competitive levels. The opening of new and more efficient facilities in China in 1992/3 meant that their costs of production were lower than the cartel producers', and their products were of high quality. Indeed, one of the cartel members (Takeda C. I. 
Arbitrage
Contending with international arbitrage was a challenge for all the cartels, but it placed particular pressure on the management of the Vitamins cartel. As the cartels operated globally, the price-fixing process was constantly undermined by currency 
Decline, overcapacity, rising costs
Decline and overcapacity are frequently cited as reasons why many cartels form in the first place. However, coupled with rising costs, these also serve to frustrate attempts at raising prices. The extent to which the Sorbates (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) 60 industry suffered from overcapacity is demonstrated by the exit from the market in 2000 of two major players (Eastman & Nippon Goeshi). Overcapacity during the late 1990s was estimated at 10,000 tons of Sorbates, with the result that prices were kept low, despite the presence of a cartel. 61 In the case of the Organic Peroxides cartel, the market grew steadily throughout the 1990s but overcapacity prevented prices from increasing. Indeed it was only after the cartel ceased that prices began to rise, as the industry finally shed some of its overcapacity 62 . These problems coincided with the increasing cost of environmental regulation, making investment and development difficult. The Sodium Gluconate (1987 Gluconate ( -1995 cartel also suffered escalating production costs throughout the 1990s, and from the fluctuating prices of the main raw material used in the production process: dextrose from corn. 63 Where there is gross overcapacity and a cartel is failing to raise prices, it may be in the interest of the most efficient firms to leave the cartel and compete for a greater market share. A more concentrated industry following the exit of inefficient firms is not undesirable, so long as the efficiency gains are substantial enough to outweigh any unilateral effects.
Cartels simply serve to prolong the life of firms that are not competitive.
Barriers to entry, substitutability and distrust
Surprisingly, relatively poor barriers to entry and unforeseen substitutability contributed to the failure of some of the cartels. The Amino Acids (1990 Acids ( -1995 cartel is an example of this. In the late 1980s/early 1990s there was healthy demand growth in amino acids, prompting the incumbent producers (Ajinomoto, Daesang, Kyowa and Sewon) to increase capacity and form the cartel. However the market growth attracted new entrants ADM and Cheil who already had substantial operations in other parts of the chemicals industry, and so could easily switch to the production of amino acids. 
Asia crisis
Many of the problems outlined above were compounded by the Asia crisis in the late 1990s. The Choline Chloride cartel was particularly affected, as it already suffered from substantial overcapacity. 69 The Sorbates (1978 Sorbates ( -1996 
Mergers acquisitions and restructuring
The chemicals industry has a long history of mergers and acquisitions, many of which broadly created a more concentrated industry more conducive to collusion. However, continued merger activity during the cartels, coupled with industry restructuring, put pressure on cartels, as the identities and capacities of the players constantly changed.
An example of this is MCAA Chemicals (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) 72 . This cartel involved monochloracetic acid, the market for which was in steady decline, but no serious competition existed from Asia. The cartel ended when an outside firm, Clariant, acquired Hoechst's MCAA business in 1997, and blew the whistle on that cartel in return for immunity.
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The findings of this section cast doubt over the effectiveness of the 1996 leniency notice. Half of the cases uncovered by the notice operated in just one industry. The infringements were closely linked to one another, and can all be traced back to the Vitamins and Amino Acids cases, investigations into which were both initiated in the US before leniency applications were made in Europe. These links may have strongly influenced a firm's decision to self-report. There is also evidence that these infringements had largely failed before leniency applications were made, because of prevailing conditions in the market. Rather than inducing the self-reporting of successful cartels, the notice may have largely attracted leniency applications from firms seeking to put their competitors at a disadvantage following the failure of a cartel. Even in the US, although some investigations (e.g. Lysine and Auction Houses 74 ) were opened well before the cartels ceased operating, we know that in others (such as Methylgucamine and Sorbates) the investigation was opened after the cartels failed. 
IV. The revised 2002 Leniency Notice
The findings in sections II and III relate to the 1996 leniency notice. As cartel investigations in Europe typically take at least three to four years to complete (before appeals), we can only make a preliminary assessment of the revised 2002 notice, and it will be some years before a study of the latest 2006 notice 75 can be carried out. A key question is whether the findings above, which cast doubt over the effectiveness of the leniency notice, persist beyond the significant 2002 reforms.
A. Important changes made in the 2002 leniency notice
It was widely acknowledged that despite its purported successes, the 1996 leniency notice suffered certain flaws which limited its effectiveness. 76 The main criticisms of the notice were that it lacked clarity and certainty. Its lack of clarity was mainly due to its subjective wording; in particular in stating that an 'instigator' or firm with a 'determining role' could not be granted full or very substantial immunity, and that leniency would only be granted if the applicant was the 'first to adduce decisive evidence of the cartel's existence'. There was no guidance as to when these conditions were satisfied. Secondly, there was an inherent lack of certainty as to how a firm would be treated once it had approached the Commission; full or very substantial immunity was only available if the Commission had not already opened an investigation into the cartel, or already had enough evidence to prove its existence.
This was problematic because prospective applicants could not be sure whether this was the case, and because firms might be more likely to cooperate and produce evidence once an investigation had been opened.
There were also two further problems. First, leniency applicants were unsure of the level of leniency granted to them before the Commission delivered its final decision, several years later. Secondly, they were required to 'put an end to [their] involvement in the illegal activity no later than the time at which [they disclosed] the Ostensibly the figures illustrated in Table 6 above suggest a maturing of the European Leniency notice, with less dependence on the US and greater independent success at uncovering infringements. However, a breakdown of cartels by industry in Table 7 reveals that almost half of the cartels punished continue to be in the chemicals industry. In addition, the firms involved in these four infringements link them to earlier cartels in the chemicals industry, revealed under the 1996 leniency notice. These links are illustrated in 
Sodium Gluconate
Methionine DEGUSSA This paper has revealed that the majority of cartels uncovered under the 1996 leniency notice were already (or broadly contemporaneously) under investigation in the US, where the incentive to self-report is much stronger. All but one of the EU only leniency cases had failed before self-reporting occurred. Moreover, approximately half of the infringements ostensibly uncovered by the notice (all of them US-EU leniency cases), were linked to each other by virtue of common membership. All had ceased before leniency applications were made in Europe. Evidence from Commission decisions and industry literature suggest that this was largely due to the prevailing conditions in the market; in particular new entry from China, the Asia crisis and industry crises. A preliminary look at infringements revealed through the reformed 2002 notice suggest that there is now less reliance on prior US success.
However, half of the cases continue to involve cartels in the chemicals industry, closely related to those uncovered under the 1996 notice.
The fact that many of the cartels revealed through leniency applications had already failed at the time, is of particular concern. In this respect the leniency notice may have simply provided some firms with a way to: (i) discount the cost of committing the infringement in terms of the sanctions they would face, thus benefiting collusion by taming the end-game; (ii) provide a way for those firms to put their former cartel partners (now once again competitors) at a competitive disadvantage, by ensuring that they face fines of up to 10 per cent of their annual turnover (as is allowed under Regulation 1/2003) while they themselves benefit from immunity. In none of the cases involving leniency do we see clear evidence of an active, profitable cartel being disrupted solely by the incentives provided by the European leniency notice. That is not to say, however, that the presence of a leniency programme did not speed up the demise of some of these infringements.
To a lesser extent it may be that the leniency notice, despite the 2002 reforms, suffers from inherent uncertainties for the firm wanting to reveal. immunity to be secured, and the introduction of a marker system. the use of the plea-bargaining system. By contrast in EC competition law, the only available sanction for cartels on the Community level is fines of up to 10 per cent of an undertaking's worldwide turnover. The greater the difference between the leniency prize (immunity) and the level of sanction otherwise faced, the greater the incentive to reveal an infringement. 90 This would explain disappointing results from a leniency programme even if it is of optimal design. In addition to the severe threat of sanctions for those who fail to self-report, a perception that detection is likely, and a high level of transparency and predictability within the system as a whole, can also be identified as important to achieving deterrence.
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One further challenge facing the European leniency programme is tensions with efforts to encourage private enforcement for damages. A firm contemplating revealing an infringement in return for immunity from a Commission fine will be less likely to do so if private actions for damages of an uncertain magnitude are likely to follow. Private enforcement is currently perceived as weak in the EU as compared to 88 See for example: Id., 20-3. 89 Under 'Amnesty Plus' a firm negotiating a fine at plea bargain can obtain a further discount by providing information that relates to a different infringement. For arguments as to why this should be the US, although it is unclear how many out of court settlements occur. Despite this, it has been suggested that leniency applicants may be reluctant to approach the European Commission with evidence of an infringement which might later be discoverable in the context of a US civil action claim where up to treble damages can be awarded. The Commission has made efforts to prevent this from happening; it has shown some willingness to accept oral rather than written submissions 92 , and has explicitly recognized that the tension can be detrimental to the effectiveness of leniency.
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As the reforms to the leniency programme take effect, and as sanctions increase, the Commission is likely to receive greater numbers of leniency applications. Priority should be given to cases involving active cartels, as these are more likely to be deterrence enhancing than punishing cartels which have failed. It also makes it less likely that firms will gain from the leniency programme -or use it as a strategic tool -after collusion has ceased. Given the resources needed to effectively act on leniency applications, the Commission is already finding it difficult to prevent a backlog of leniency applications. There is a danger that cases will start being turned away; an outcome that does not lend itself to increased deterrence. 
